Desempeño, gobierno corporativo y nueva regulacion
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.29105/rinn9.18-4Palabras clave:
Desempeño Financiero, Gobierno Corporativo, RegulaciónResumen
Después de la adopción del Código de Gobierno Corporativo en México, algunas compañías incrementaron el desempeño financiero y el uso de deuda durante los siguientes cinco anos, nuestra investigación se enfoca en como dichas compañías mejoraron sus prácticas de gobierno corporativo y como estas prácticas se han traducido en un mejor relación de riesgo y rendimiento. En esta investigación exploramos cómo y en dónde mejores prácticas de gobierno corporativo afectan el desempeño y qué relación tiene con la Transparencia, Nuevas Regulaciones y prácticas de Gobierno Corporativo. Con lo anterior también identificamos aquellas compañías que cotizan fuera de México para identificar potenciales diferencias en dichas prácticas.
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