Funds transfers and political parties. Study of Mexican municipalities

Authors

  • Silverio Tamez Garza Autonomous University of Nuevo León image/svg+xml
  • Adriana Verónica Hinojosa Cruz Autonomous University of Nuevo León image/svg+xml
  • Carlos Augusto Jiménez Zárate Autonomous University of Nuevo León image/svg+xml

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.29105/rinn10.19-5

Keywords:

Municipalities, Paving and Spaces Fund Goods, Political Parties, Population

Abstract

In this paper we analyze how much influence the political party with the largest nationwide (Partido Revolucionario Institucional: PRI) in the Congress, specifically the House of Representatives, in the distribution of the Funds of Branch 23: Paving Fund and Sports Spaces for Municipalities, for the year 2010 which is when this fund was created and for the year 2011. The results of our analysis were that there is a positive impact in the influence of the political party with the largest presence in the Chamber of Deputies in the allocation of resources to those municipalities that are governed by mayors from the PRI.

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Published

2013-01-25

How to Cite

Tamez Garza, S., Hinojosa Cruz, A. V., & Jiménez Zárate, C. A. (2013). Funds transfers and political parties. Study of Mexican municipalities. Innovaciones De Negocios, 10(19), 107–123. https://doi.org/10.29105/rinn10.19-5