La influencia de los medios de comunicación sobre las decisiones de inversión. El caso de las burbujas

Joaquim Perramon Ayza

doi:10.29105/rinn11.22-6

Authors

Joaquim Perramon Ayza University of Barcelona

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.29105/rinn11.22-6

Keywords:

bubbles, financial press, investment, media

Abstract

We analyzed how information in the financial press influences investment decisions and the specific case of economic bubbles. We found considerable flaws in the information market due to several factors: demand, the predominance of what are termed “irrational investors” (herding), and supply, which has the problem that the sources of information are biased and feeds back. A financial bubble is a deviation between real value of a financial asset and its persistent market price in time, which also has a speculative origin fed back by the illusion of the owners of these financial values, who will take benefits because of the future prices, which must be higher than the previous ones. In this context, the economical information in the media is submitting three problems. First of all, it is information generated by companies. In second place, the information circuit is fed back. A problem of informative independence becomes created, particularly serious in the case of the banks, which are at the same time creditors. And in a third place, some informative biases are manifested for the companies of regulated sectors which are starring the economical information in the media.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

References

Barber, B. M. & Odean, T. (2007). All that glitters: The effect of attention and news on the buying behavior of individual and institutional investors, The Review of Financial Studies, 21(2), 785-718.

Brunnermeier, M. K. & Abreu, D. (2004). Bubbles and crashes, Econometrika, 71(1), 173-204.

Brunnermeier, M. K. (2003). Information leakage and market efficiency, Princeton University Research Paper, June, available at www.princeton.edu/~markus/research/papers/information_leakage.pdf (accessed 30 july 2011).

Brunnermeier, M. K. (2001). Asset pricing under asymmetric information. Bubles, Crashes, Technical Analysis, and Herding. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Cassidy, J. (2009). Porqué quiebran los mercados. La lógica de los desastres financieros. Trad. Efrén del Valle, Barcelona: RBA Libros.

Chomsky, N. (2002). Media control: The spectacular achievements of propaganda. New York:Seven Stories Press.

Davis, A. (2007). The economic inefficiencies of market liberalization, Global Media and Communication, 3(2), 157–78.

Davis, A. (2006). Media effects and the question of the rational audience: lessons from the financial markets, Media Culture, 28(4), 603-625.

Davis, A. (2006). The role of mass media in investor relations, Journal of Communication Manegement, 10(1), 7-17.

Deephouse, D. L. (2000). Media reputation as a strategic resource: an integration of mass communication and resource-based theories, Journal of Management, 26(6), 1091-1112.

Deephouse, D. L. (1997). The effect of financial and media reputations on performance, Corporate Reputation Review, 1(1), 68-72.

Dyck, A., Moss, D. & Zingales, L. (2008). Media versus special interests, NBER (National Bureau of Economic Research) Working Paper, No. 14360, 1-47.

Dyck, A. & Zingales, L. (2003). Media and asset prices, Harvard Business School Working Paper Series, No 04-003, 1-43.

Dyck, A. & Zingales, L. (2002). The bubble and the media. In Cornelius, P. & B. Kogut (eds.), Corporate governance and capital flows in a global economy, New York: Oxford University Press.

Galbraith, J. K. (1990). Breve historia de la euforia financiera. Trad. Vicente Villacampa, Barcelona: Ed. Ariel.

Galbraith, J. K. (1956). El crac del 29. Trad J. Ferrer Aleu, Barcelona: Ed. Ariel.

Gentzkow, M. & Shapiro, J. (2006). Media bias and reputation, Journal of Political Economy, 114(2), 280-316.

Helm, S. (2007). The role of corporate reputation in determining investor satisfaction and loyalty, Corporate Reputation Review, 10(1), 22-37.

Herman, E. S. (2000).The propaganda model: a retrospective, Journalism Studies, 1(1), 101–12.

Inoue, K. (2009). The role of communication in investor relation practices, 経営論集第74号（2009年11月).

Kindleberger, C. P. (1978). Manias, panics, and crashes: A history of financial crises. New York: Basic Books.

Milgrom, P. (2008). What the seller won’t tell you: Persuasion and disclosure markets, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 22(2), 115-131.

Milgrom, P. (1981). Good news and bad news: representation theorems and applications, The Bell Journal of Economics, 12(2), 380-391.

Perramon, J. (2012). Bombolles financeres I confusió informative. Relació entre la informació económica als Mitjans de comunicació i la presa de decisions d’inversió, Pròleg de Jordi Goula i Epíleg a càrrec d’Iu Pijoan. Ed. Kit Book. Dipòsit Digital de la UB.

Schuster, T. (2003). Fifty-fifty. Stock recommendations and stock prices. Effects and benefits of investment advice in the business media, Institute for Communication & Media Research (Leipzig University), Working Paper No. 03-01, 1-36.

Shiller, R. (2000). Exhuberancia irracional. Trad. Teresa Arijón. México, D. F: Editorial Oceano

Shleifer, A. & Mullainathan, S. (2005). The market for news, The American Economic Review,85(4),1031-1053.

Srivastava, R. K., Crosby, J. R., McInish, T. H., Wood, R. A. & Capraro, A. J. (2000). The value of corporate reputation: Evidence from the equity markets, Corporate Reputation Review, 1(1), 62-68.

Thompson, P. A. (2009). Market manipulation? Applying the propaganda model to financial media reporting, Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture, 6(2). 73-96.